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OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through 
its ROAD COMMISSION, 
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vs. 
BETTY LeSOURD, a woman, ALEX 
T. DAVIES and THELMA DAVIES, 
his wife, and VALLEY BANK & 
TRUST COMPANY, 
Defendants and Respondents. 




All italics are ours and are added for emphasis. 
The parties will be referred to as in the Trial Court. 
"R" refers to Record and "T. R." refers to Transcript 
of Record. 
1 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action in eminent domain, brought by 
the State of Utah, by and through its Road Commission 
to acquire certain land owned by the defendants for 
highway purposes. The only issues before the Court 
below were the fair market value of the property taken 
by the State as of the 12th day of September, 1967, , 
the damage to the remainder, if any, and the amount 
of land owned by defendants and effected by the take. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Civil actions Nos. 3753 and 3736, on file in the 
District Court of Summit County, State of Utah, were 
consolidated for purposes of trial before the Court, 
sitting without a jury. At the conclusion of the trial, 
the Court entered judgment in favor of the defendants 
and against the plaintiff in the sum of $65,990.00, as 
just compensation for the property condemned and 
damages to the remainder of defendants' properties. 
Plaintiff filed a Motion for New Trial, or in the alter-
native, a l\iiotion for Remittiture, which Motions were 
duly argued to the Court and denied. Thereafter, the 
plaintiff filed its Notice of Appeal to this Court. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff asks that the judgment and ruling of the 
Lower Court be reversed and a new trial ordered. 
2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff filed two actions in the District Court 
of Swnmit County, State of Utah, pursuant to the law 
of eminent domain in this State for the purpose of 
condemning, for highway purposes, defendants' rights 
in .48 acre of real property described as Parcel Nos. 
28, 28:H, 28:F, and 28:G, as more fully set forth in 
the Complaints on file herein. 
By stipulation of counsel, the Summons and Com-
plaints were served upon the respective defendants on 
September 12, 1967, and as such would constitute the 
date of taking and the date upon which all testimony 
and evidetnce relative to values would be directed and 
predicated (R 79, 80}. 
The subject property is located near the intersec-
tion of U. S. Highway 40 and Highway U-248, in 
Summit County, Utah, commonly known as Kimball's 
Junction (TR 620). Prior to, and at 'the date of tak-
ing, a business consisting of a garage, service station, 
cafe, and small cabins was conducted upon a portion 
of the property. The improvements were concentrated 
upon approximately 1.33 acres of land adjacent to U. S. 
Highway 40 (TR 621, 631), being Parcels 5 and 6, 
Ex. P-4. Access was confined to two thir'ty foot open-
ings located on opposite sides of the gasoline pumps 
(TR 620). 
The defendants Alex Davies and Thelma Davies, 
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wife, purchased their property from Emmett llrooks 
in 1952 (TR 70, Ex. P-13). At the commencement 
of the trial, defendants asserted that they owned ap-
proximately 8 acres of land which comprised the parcel 
from which the taking was made and was the parcel 
damaged in the condemnation proceedings (TR 56) . 
The plaintiff maintained that the defendants did not 
own all of the land claimed, and the determination of 
just compensation should be limited to that unit or 
parcel of land owned by said defendants and effected 
by the take (TR 15, 16, 17). 
The Trial Court concluded that an issue of title 
existed which should be resolved before considering 
any evidence relative to damages (TR 52). The evi-
dence of title to the area consisted, in part, of plaintiff's 
Exhibits P-4 and P-10, and Abstracts of Title (P-11, 
P-12, P-13, P-14, P-15, P-16 and P-17), which were 
used extensively in tracing the indicia of title of the 
parcels of land directly involved. Exhibit P-4 is a 
tracing with several overlays prepared by the witness, 
Darwin McGuire, licensed abstractor, who appeared 
as a witness in behalf of the plaintiff. The exhibit is 
designed to illustra'te the land description in the chain 
of title to each tract, and is numbered and colored to 
correspond with each Abstract of Title (Ex. P-11 
to P-17). Mr. Charles W. Romney, Esq., who is a 
licensed abstractor and attorney, searched and examined 
the official records of Summit County, State of Utah, 
and examined the Abstracts of Title in evidence and 
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testified relative to the title to the various parcels (TR 
223, 224, and 225) . 
Utilizing the parcels nwnbered on Exhibit P-4, 
the testimony of both the abstractor, Darwin McGuire, 
and the testimony of Charles W. Romney, Esq., can 
be summarized in the following manner: 
I. Parcels 1 and 2 are vested in Summit County, 
a municipal corporation (TR 223) . 
2. Parcel 3 (not involved in this action) is vested 
in the American Legion (TR 223) . 
3. Parcel 4 was owned by C.H. Stoven and Flor-
ence M. Stoven, his wife, and was sold to Summit 
County by an Agreement to Sell Real Estate which 
appears of record in the office of the County Recorder 
of Swnmit County, State of Utah, as Entry No. 49040 
(Ex. P-11) (TR 173). 
4. Parcels 5, 6 and 7 are vested in Betty LeSourd 
(TR 223). 
5. Parcel 8, in yellow and the unnwnbered por-
tions in yellow, are vested in the State of Utah (TR 
224), (P-4). 
6. Parcel 9, in red, belongs to U. S. Highway 
Thirty Association (TR 225) . 
7. Parcels IOA. IOB, and IOC, colored in light blue, 
with the exception of that portion of IOC covered by 
red hash m arks, belongs to L. J. Tree (TR 223, 224). 
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8. That portion of Parcel IOC, in blue and cov-
ered by the red hash marks, belongs to Betty LeSourd 
(TR 223). 
9. Parcel II, in the dark green, is vested in the 
State of Utah (TR 224). 
In 1963 the defendants, Alex Davies and Thelma 
Davies, his wife, executed a Warranty Deed in favor 
of their daughter, Betty LeSourd, pertaining to Parcel 
No. 7, shown on Exhibit P-4 and reserved a life estate 
unto themselves (TR 188). Thereafter, in March, 1964, 
Alex Davies and Thelma Davies, his wife, executed 
a Warranty Deed in favor of Betty LeSourd, describ-
ing Parcels 5, 6, and 7 as shown on Exhibit P-4 and 
reserved life estates therein (TR 188). 
In 1965, Alex Davies and Thelma Davies, his 
wife, executed two Warranty Deeds in favor of Betty 
LeSourd (Ex. D-7, D-8). One deed used the de-
scription of Parcel No. 2 of the Bush and Gudgell 
Survey (Ex. P-10), and comprised 0.595 acre, which 
constitutes a part of Parcels 9 and IO-A, of Ex. P-4 
(TR 189). The other deed used the description of 
Parcel No. I of the Bush and Gudgell Survey (Ex. 
P-10) comprising 7.975 acres, which constitutes Parcels 
I, 2. 4, 5, 6, 7, parts of 9, 10-B and 10-C of Ex. P-4 
(TR 190). 
With respect to the land claimed and in dispute, 
the defendants had only paid taxes upon the same for 
6 
two years immediately preceding the filing of the Con-
demnation Complaints (R 49, TR 209). 
The defendant Thelma Davies testified that the 
old county road, which bisects the land claimed by them, 
has in fact, been used at times by the public (R 100). 
Alex Davies testified that gravel had been removed 
from the old road right of way without his consent 
(TR 116, 123). 
At the conclusion of the hearing on the title issue, 
the Court ruled that the defendants had established 
their "claim of interest" in and to 6.27 acres of land 
to "be considered for the purpose of this taking as 
being the property of the defendants" (R 49, 50), 
(TR 266, 267). As a consequence of the Court's 
ruling, and subject to the objections of plaintiff, all 
evidence and testimony relative to the damages were 
predicated upon the premise that the taking was from 
the 6.27 acres and damage to the remaining parcel by 
reason thereof. 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR 
IN HOLDING THAT THE PARCEL OF 
LAND OWNED BY THE DEFENDANTS, 
ALEX T. DA VIES AND THELMA DA VIES, 
HIS WIFE, AND BETTY LESOURD, EF-
FECTED BY THE CONDEMNATION CON-
7 
SISTED OF 6.27 ACRES OF LAND. 
A. THE COURT ERRED IN ALLO\VING 
TESTIMONY OF THE VALUE OF THE PAR-
CEL COMPRISING 6.27 ACRES BEFORE 
THE TAKE AND EVIDENCE OF VALUE OF 
THE REMAINING PROPERTIES C01"1PRIS-
ING 5.85 ACRES. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANTS HAVE FAILED TO SUS-
TAIN THE BURDEN OF PROOF OF SUCH 
AN INTEREST IN THE PARCEL OF LAND 




THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR 
IN HOLDING THAT THE PARCEL OF LAND 
O':VNED BY THE DEFENDANTS, ALEX T. 
DA VIES AND THELMA DA VIES, HIS WIFE, 
AND BETTY LESOURD, EFFECTED BY 
THE CONDEMNATION CONSISTED OF 6.27 
ACRES OF LAND. 
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The law is well settled in this State that in order 
to acquire title by adverse possession, it is essential 
under the provisions of 78-12-11 and 78-12-12 Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, as amended, claimants must 
show and prove all of the requisite elements set forth. 
"78-12-11. \Vhat constitutes adverse posses-
sion not under written instrument. - For the 
purpose of constituting an adverse possession by 
a person claiming title, not founded upon a writ-
ten instrument, judgment or decree land is 
deemed to have been possessed and occupied in 
the following cases only: 
1. 'Vhere it has been protected by a substan-
tial inclosure. 
2. Where it has been unusually cultivated or 
improved. 
3. 'Vhere labor or money has been expended 
upon dams, canals, embankments, aqueducts or 
otherwise for the purpose of irrigating such lands 
amounting to the sum of $5 per acre." 
"78-12-12. - Possession must be continuous, 
and taxes paid - In no case shall adverse pos-
session be considered established under the pro-
visions of any section of this Code, unless it shall 
be shown that the land has been occupied and 
claimed for the period of seven years continu-
ously, and that the party, his predecessors and 
grantors have paid all taxes which have been 
levied and assessed upon such land according to 
law." 
The cases are legion that unless each of the ele-
ments set forth under the aforesaid Code provisions 
have been complied with, no valid title can be 
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acquired in properties occupied by claimants. See the 
following authorities: 
Jenkins vs. lVIorgan, 113 Utah 534, 196 P. 2d 871; 
Tripp vs. Bagley, 74 Utah 57, 72, 276 P. 912; 
D. H. Perry Estate vs. Ford, 46 Utah 436, 151 
P. 59; 
Homeowners Loan Corporation vs. Dudley, 105 
Utah 208, 221 P. 2d 160; 
Keller vs. Chournos, 102 Utah 535, 133 P. 2d 318; 
Smith vs. Nelson, 114 Utah 51, 197 P. 2d 132. 
There is no evidence or testimony in the record 
which would sustain any claim of any right, title, in-
terest, or estate in and to Parcel No. 3, vested in the 
American Legion; Parcel No. 4, owned by C. H. Sto-
ven and his wife Florence M. Stoven subject to a 
contract of sale in favor of Summit County; Parcel 
No. 9, vested in U. S. Highway Thirty Association; 
Parcels lOA, lOB, and that portion of lOC not cov-
ered by red hash marks, vested in L. J. Tree, all of 
which are shown on plaintiff's Exhibit P-4 and sup-
ported by Exhibits P-11 through P-17. 
With respect to the portion of land owned by Sum-
mit County comprising tracts designated as Parcels 
1, 2, and 4 upon plaintiff's Exhibit 4, it is likewise pat-
ently clear and well established under the law of this 
State that a party cannot, by adverse use or possession, 
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perfect or acquire any interest in realty, adverse to the 
interest of the sovereign. By virtue of this rule of law 
as recognized by this Court, the defendants would, in 
no event regardless of the extent and nature of their 
use of said land, acquire any interest by adverse use 
against Summit County. The undisputed evidence and 
testimony is that Summit County acquired the fee title 
to the subject property by 'Varranty Deed in statutory 
form, without restriction (Ex. P-17) , and was on the 
date of the taking vested with the fee simple title of 
said land. 
In Peterson vs. Johnson, 84 Utah 89, 34 P. 2d 
697, this Court stated as follows: 
"_Moreover, one may not acquire title to any 
part of the public domain by enclosing the same 
within his fence or by adverse possession. Utah 
Copper Company vs. Ekman, 47 Utah 164, 152 
P. 178." 
In Cassity vs. Castagna, 10 Utah 2d 16, 347 
P. 2d 834: "One may not adverse the sovereign. 
Lund vs. 'Vilcox, 34 Utah 205, 97 P. 33." 
The rule of law is likewise announced in 2 C.J.S., 
Adverse Possession, Section 14 as follows; 
"Generally speaking, title to property dedi-
cated or devoted to a public use cannot be ac-
quired by prescription or adverse possession. 
Title to such property cannot be acquired by 
adverse possession as against the public or as 
against the State or a political subdivision there-
of, such as a county." (See authorities cited 
therein.) 
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Under the provisions of 57-1-12 Utah Code An-
notated, 1953, as amended, which replaces former 78-
1-11 U.C.A. 1943, when a Deed of Conveyance has 
been executed and delivered in the form prescribed by 
said statute it has " * * * the effect of a conveyance 
in fee simple to the Grantee, * * * ." 
57-1-3 Utah Code Annotated 1953, which is the 
former 78-1-11 U.C.A. 1943, sets forth the following 
provision: 
"A fee simple title is presumed to be intended 
to pass by a conveyance of real estate, unless it 
appears from the conveyance that a lessor state 
was intended." 
In the case of White vs. Salt Lake City, 121 Utah 
134, 239 P. 2d 210, this Court in considering the 
issues, and certain statutes, which we believe are 
applicable to the issues raised in this case, there stated: 
"But as long as the dedicated street remains 
platted as a public thoroughfare, the statutory 
provision that the fee is vested in the County 
Commission can only be interpreted to mean that 
the rights of the county, acting through its Com-
missioners, are superior to those of the abutting 
property owners insofar as the normal use of the 
street is concerned. We have clearly changed 
by statute the old common law rule insofar as 
streets in platted subdivisions are concerned." 
" * * * The provisions enumerating the powers 
of the County Commissioners clearly indicate 
that the legislature did not regard the dedica-
tion to the public of the street in a platted sub-
division as the surrender of an easement with 
12 
retention of the fee to the corpus in the abutting 
owner the segregated statutory provisions are 
reconcilable when construed to mean that the 
county or city authoritie.s are vested with the fee 
in the streets. Such ownership carries with it 
the right to use it for the enumerated purposes 
when, in their discretion, it best serves the public 
interest. It may be abandoned and, in that case, 
the right to the use and control of this roadway 
would revert to the abutting owner pursuant to 
36-1-7 and common law principles." 
Of further significance to the issue are the pro-
visions of Title 36, Chapter 1, Section 3, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1943, and 36-1-3 U.C.A. 1943 and 27-1-3 
U.C.A. 1953 which provide as follows: 
"All highways once established must continue 
to be highways until abandoned by order of the 
Board of County Commissioners of the County 
in which they are situated or other competent 
authority." 
The defendant land owners did not present any 
competent evidence or testimony that the Board of 
County Commissioners of Summit County, or other 
competent authority had enacted in proper statutory 
form, or otherwise, any appropriate Resolution or 
Ordinance authorizing or directing the abandonment 
or vacation of Parcels 1, 2, and 4, Exhibit P-4. 
The distinction between a situation where the 
municipal authorities have the unqualified fee 
and where a mere easement of use as a public street 
or highway has been taken is set forth in 70 A.L.R. 
13 
at Page 565: 
"The rule to the effect that, where the absolute 
and unqualified fee in a street is in a munici-
pality, the title remains in the municipality un-
affected by the vacation or abandonment of the 
street as such, is impliedly supported by Schlan-
ger vs. Schulman (1925) 211 App. Div. 601, 
207 N. Y. Supp. 723, and Frank W. Coy Real 
Estate vs. Pendleton (1924) 45 R. I. 477, 123 
Atl. 562. 
Of further significance is the language set forth 
and contained in 39 Am. J ur. 2d 518 Section 146, 
which reads as follows: 
"Where the procedure for the vacation or dis-
continuance of a highway or street by direct 
action of the public authorities is prescribed by 
statute, it is necessary to adhere to such proce-
dure in order that the vacation may be effective, 
and there can be no estoppel to deny the vacation 
or discontinuance of a highway or street in the 
absence of substantial compliance with the pro-
cedure prescribed by statute. * * * " 
In 39 C.J.S. 1073, Section 137 the following addi-
tional rule is set forth: 
"From the principle stated in the proceeding 
section, it regularly follows that when the high-
way is discontinued or abandoned the land be-
comes discharged of the servitude, and the abso-
lute title to the land covered by the highway 
reserved reverts to the owner of the fee without 
any further action of the highway authorities, 
except where the fee to the highway has passed 
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to the public. The general rule governs even in 
cases where a new and different highway is sub-
stituted for the one abandoned. * * * ,, 
In Stillwater vs. Lovell, (Okla. 1932) 15 P. 2d 12, 
the Court said : 
"I. 'A municipal corporation has no inherent 
power to vacate a street within its limits or any 
part thereof. Even when specifically authorized 
by the legislature to vacate streets a municipal 
corporation cannot lawfully vacate a public 
street or highway for the benefit of a private 
individual. A street or highway cannot be vacated 
unless it is for the benefit of the public that such 
action should be taken." 
"2. 'If the public interest is not the motive 
which prompts the vacation of a street whether 
partial or entire the act of vacation is an abuse 
of power and especially is it a gross abuse of 
power if it is authorized without reference to the 
rights of the public and merely that the con-




Defendants failed to present any evidence of any 
document in writing which would support their claim 
of title as required under the provisions of Title 25, 
Chapter 5, Section 1, Utah Code Annotated (1953) 
(Statute of Frauds), which would support their claim 
of title to the land with the exception of Parcels 5, 6, 
and 7, Exhibit P-4. 
The Trial Court determined that in view of the 
deed issued by Summit County to the Utah State Road 
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Commission, two portions of land, originally claimed 
by the defendants, were owned by the Utah State Road 
Commission and would not, therefore, be considered 
as property of the defendants in the issue of deter-
mining just compensation (TR 266, 267). Of neces-
sity and to justify such a ruling, the Court had to 
conclude that Summit County had a valid right and 
interest in the property in order to convey to the 
plaintiff an interest paramount to that of the defendants. 
How then can the Trial Court conclude that the re-
maining land standing in the name of the County is 
now vested or "owned" by the defendants? It is our 
position that the authorities cited hereinabove, applied 
to the testimony and evidence adduced at the trial con-
clusively demonstrates that the Trial Court erred in 
its ruling on the issue of title. The ownership of the 
other tracts involved likewise cannot be sustained by 
the defendants on the basis of the evidence and testi-
mony presented, as nowhere in the transcript does there 
appear any competent evidence or testimony which 
would support the title asserted by the defendants 
and which, we believe, would at best constitute a mere 
possessory interest without any other indicia of own-
ership. 
POINT I (A) 
THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING TES-
TIMONY OF THE VALUE OF THE PARCEL 
COMPRISING 6.27 ACRES BEFORE THE 
16 
TAKE AND EVIDENCE OF VALUE OF THE 
REMAINING PROPERTIES COMPRISING 
5.85 ACRES. 
Subsection ( 2), Title 78, Chapter 34, Section 10 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, provides: 
" * * * ( 2) If the property sought to be con-
demned constitutes only a part of a larger parcel, 
the damages which will accrue to the portion 
not sought to be condemned by reason of its 
severance from the portion sought to be con-
demned and the construction of the improvement 
in the manner proposed by the plaintiff." 
There can be no doubt that under certain circum-
stances compensation for the taking by right of emi-
nent domain of a parcel or parcels of land may include 
recovery for injury to the remaining portion of the 
land caused from its separation from the condemned 
part where the parcels have been used as a single 
economic unit for a common purpose. However, in 
order to allow such severance damage plaintiff con-
tends that there must be a unity of ownership between 
the part taken and the remaining property. The unity 
of ownership must of necessity involve something more 
than a "squattor's right' 'or a bare assertion of 
ship without any competent indicia of title. Of sig-
nificance on this point we ref er the Court to the case 
of Mcintyre vs. Board of County Commissioners, 168 
Kan. 115, 211 P.2d 59. In that action, eminent domain 
proceedings were commenced to establish a road across 
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a portion of two adjoining separate tracts of land owned 
separately by a husband and his wife. Although the 
two tracts had been used jointly as a single unit for 
the operation of a farm, the Court rejected the theory 
that the husband was entitled to damages for the de-
preciation of the value of his tract on account of the 
taking of the tract belonging to his wife, there announc-
ing the following rule: 
"The pieces of land alleged to be a single tract 
must be owned by the same party, and one owner 
is not entitled to recover compensation for land 
taken from him because of alleged damage re-
sulting to that portion of land remaining on 
account of the taking of land belonging to him. 
Even though, as under the facts of this case, 
the two tracts have been farmed and operated 
as one unit." 
In Williamstown vs: Wallace, ( 1958 Ky.) 316, 
S. W. 2d 373, the Court, relying upon the rule that 
"there must be identical ownership where incidental 
damage to a parcel of land other than that over which 
a right-of-way is condemned was claimed," held: 
" * * * Where a portion of a tract of land 
owned by a husband was condemned for the con-
struction of a city reservoir, thereby separating 
the remaining portion of the tract from an ad-
joining tract which was operated by him as a 
unit, but was owned by his wife, and on which 
were located the family residence and other im-
provements, the husband was not entitled to 
damages for severance and the resulting incon-
venience by the taking of a portion of his own 
property." 
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In Rath vs. Sanitary District of Landcaster County 
(1953) 156 Neb. 444, 56 N.W. 2d 741, a question arose 
as to whether or not several separate tracts constituted 
one contiguous unit thereby entitling the owner to 
claim severance damages. In addressing itself to the 
issue, the Court forth the following rule: 
"One contiguous tract or unit is that which in 
general belongs to the same proprietor as that 
taken, and is continuous with it and used to-
gether for a common purpose, whether or not 
the same is separated by platted or existing lines, 
lots, blocks, streets, alleys, or like divisions." 
In the case of County of San Benito vs. Copper 
Mountain Company of California, et al (Calif. 
1935) 45 P. 2d 428, Appellants were claiming sever-
ance damages to certain mining claims which were 
located in the vicinty of the land sought to be con-
demned, contending that it was essential to the opera-
tion of their mines that they have the use of certain 
water that originated and flowed over the land which 
was sought to be condemned. There was no showing 
that the Appellant was the owner of or had any right 
to acquire or use the water claimed. The property for 
which severance damages was claimed was owned by 
other than the one whose land was sought to be con-
demned. In rejecting the Appellant's contention that 
they were entitled to severance damages the Court 
stated: 
"Appellants cite no authorities to the effect 
that severance damages may be awarded to one 
who is not the owner of the land sought to be 
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condemned, and we have found none that uphold 
this doctrine." (Emphasis added). 
In the case of State vs. Superior Court of Spo-
kane County, et al. (Wash. 1941) 116 P. 2d 752, a 
fact situation was presented which is somewhat analo-
gous to the instant case. In that action suit was insti-
tuted to condemn a right-of-way over a parcel of land 
standing in the name of a single individual which tract 
had been used in conj unction with two adjoining tracts , 
and operated as a single unit. However, the title to I 
the two adjoining tracts were in the names of two other 
1 
parties. The Court in rejecting the claim of conseques-
tial damages of the two parties owning the adjacent 
tracts said: 
"The fact that the three tracts were used as 
one farm, inasmuch as the ownership is divided, 
does not entitle the owners of adjacent tracts 
to damages. If Harry A. Morrison has, in addi-
tion to his ownership of Tract A, an interest, 
short of actual owners.hip, in Tracts B and C 
owned by the Realtors, and, vice versa, if Real-
tors, owners of Tracts B and C have an interest 
in Tract A to which Harry A. Morrison has 
title, that would not entitle Realtors to recovery 
of damages to any tract except that one over 
which the private way of necessity was con-
demned, which in the case at bar is over the tract 
owned by Harry A. Morrison." 
"Tracts held by different titles vested in dif-
ferent persons cannot be considered as a whole 
where it. is claimed that one is incidentally in-
jured by the taking of the other for a public 
use. This is the rule, although the owner of the 
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tract taken holds an interest in the property 
clairned to be dama,qed, and although the two 
tracts are used as one." 
"The damages for taking a right-of-way are 
based on ownership of land actually taken and 
are limited to lands held under the same title." 
(Emphasis added.) 
The general rule of law relative to the issue raised 
on this appeal is also set forth and contained in 18 Am. 
J ur., Eminent Domain, Section 271, at Page 912: 
"Tracts held by different titles vested in differ-
ent persons cannot be considered as a whole 
where it is claimed that one is incidentally in-
jured by the taking of the other for a public 
use. This is the rule, although the owner of the 
tract taken holds an interest in the property 
claimed to be damaged, and although the two 
tracts are used as one." 
A case in point adopting the foregoing rule is that 
of Mcintyre vs. Board of County Commissioners, supra, 
wherein the Court announced and set forth the follow-
ing rule: 
"The theory of compensation in eminent do-
main cases is that the owner is to be compensated 
fully for all land taken from him, including the 
dimunition in value of that remaining owned 
by him, but full compensation does not include 
dimunition in the value of the remainder caused 
by the acquisition of adjoining lands of others 
for the same undertaking." (Emphasis added). 
It has likewise been held in the case of Jonas vs. 
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State, 19 Wis. 2d 638, 121 N.W. 2d 235, that two 
distinct parcels of land may not be treated as held un4er 
a unity of ownership for the purpose of considering 
the taking of one parcel, a partial taking of the com-
bined whole, obligating the condemnor to pay severance. 
damages in addition to the value of the parcel taken, 
where one parcel is owned by a corporation and the 
other parcel by the creators of the corporation, espe-
cially where some of the corporate stock is owned by 
third persons. 
In City of Walla Walla vs. Dement Brothers Com-
pany, 67 Wash. 186, 121 Pac. 63, a suit was filed to 
condemn certain water rights of the Appellant, and 
an issue arose with respect to the ownership of the 
water rights, and the Court there addressing itself to 
the question of ownership of the rights condemned stated 
as follows: 
'A party seeking to condemn property as 
against a defendant is not bound to admit the 
nature or extent of the title of the defendant 
in such property, but may at the trial prove the 
nature and extent of such title or interest." 
All testimony and evidence was presented on the 
basis of the ownership as established by the Court's 
ruling. Clearly the foregoing authorities do not support 
the same, and we believe error was committed. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANTS HA VE FAILED TO SUS-
TAIN THE BURDEN OF PROOF OF SUCH 
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AN INTEREST IN THE PARCEL 01!-. LAND 
AS WOULD SUPPORT THE AWARD OF 
SEVERANCE DAMAGES. 
There is no dispute that this case involves the 
question of damages to a remaining parcel of land. The 
plaintiff in its Complaint set out the land being taken 
by description and then alleged that it was taken from 
a larger parcel of land as required by Subsection ( 2) 
of 78-34-10, U.C.A. 1953, Supra. The plaintiff is not 
required to define the larger parcel of land which may 
or may not be damaged by the taking of the part for 
the highway enlargement. The rule is stated in 6 
Nichols Eminent Domain, (3rd Ed.) 185, Section 
26.112: 
"\Vhen, as usually happens, only part of a 
particular parcel of land is sought to be taken, 
it is not necessary to describe the entire parcel, 
but only that part of which is required for public 
use. Neither is it necessary to describe property 
which will be damaged if the proposed improve-
ment is constructed." 
The Court has concluded that Subsection 2, supra, 
governs the question of severance damages. Board of 
Education of Logan City Sch. Dist. vs. Croft, 13 Utah 
2d 310, 373 P. 2d 697. The method of determining 
severance damages has been stated by this Court: 
"The cardinal and well-recognized rule as to 
the measure of damages to property not actually 
taken but affected by condemnation is the differ-
ence in market value of the property before and 
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after the taking." Salt Lake County Cotton-
wood Sanitary Dist. v. Toone, I I Utah 2d 232, 
357, P. 2d 486, and 488. 
"The difference in value of the remaining tract 
before and after the taking" Utah Commission vs 
Hansen, I4 Utah 2d 305, 383 P. 2d 9I7, 9I8, and 
further "the difference between the fair market value 
before and after the taking." State Road Commisston 
v. Williams, 22 Utah 2d 30I, 452 P. 2d 548, 550. 
In condemnation actions the plaintiff has the 
burden of proof of public use and the necessity of 
taking, which is not contested here, then the burden 
shifts to the landowner to prove the amount of com-
pensation to which he is entitled. In State vs. Howes, 
20 Utah 2d 246, 436 P. 2d 803, this Court held in 
regards to severance damages: 
" * * * In this respect, we are in agreement 
with the general proposition that, in a condem-
nation action, before a landowner may introduce 
evidence relating to the amount of severance 
damage he must first meet the burden of proving 
that he is entitled to that kind of damage. * * * " 
In State Road Commission vs. Utah Sugar Com-
pany, 22 Utah 2d 77, 448 P. 2d 90I, this Court held: 
"Our own authoritites, clearly or by analogy, 
substantiate the basic rule set out in Nichols, 
supra, and the concept that to justify severance 
damages, the damage must be done to the land 
itself,-not to that on top of the land which is 
not a part of the realty, or what is done on top 
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of the land, such as patrolling canals, as is the 
case here." 
This Court having adopted the before and after 
test has recognized the concept of the requirement of 
unity of use of land in order to include other land. 
"The State quite properly does not challenge 
the principle that an award of severance damages 
to the remaining property is appropriate where 
there are two or more parcels of land, although 
not contiguous, are used as constituent parts of 
a single economic unit." State Road Commission 
vs. 'Villiams, 22 Utah 2d 301, 452 P.2d 548, 
549. 
This Court also recognized that there may be two 
estates in one parcel of land, but that the land is to 
be valued as a whole and then the separate estates 
be deducted from the value of the whole. Ogden City 
vs. Stephens, 21 Utah 2d 336, 445 P. 2d 703. 
The Court in State vs. Tedesco, 4 Utah 2d 3, 286 
P. 2d 785, in a case where an adjoining owner sought 
to intervene and claiming to have an interest by virtue 
of an oral contract stated: 
"'Ve believe and hold that to graft charges 
onto and create interests in real property, which 
is the subject of condemnation, there must be 
clear and convincin,q evidence establishing such 
charge or interest, and that the evidence in this 
case falls far short of that quality or proof, as 
the Trial Court concluded." (Emphasis added). 
A good discussion of the reason for the rule of 
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unity of use and unity of ownership is contained in the 
landmark case of United States vs. Honolulu Plan-
tation Co. (9th Cir. 1950) 182 Fed. 2d 172. See also 
Ketchum Coal Co. vs. District Court of Carbon County, 
· 48 Utah 342, 159 Pac. 737. 
The above cases and statute establish that there · 
must be a larger parcel of land having a unity of use . 
and of ownership. The ownership of Parcels 5, 6 and 
7, Exhibit P-4 is conceded to be in the defendants 
Davies and Le Sourd. While plaintiff concedes the 
ownership of the above parcels of land, it does not / 
admit that the parcels have been used in a manner to : 
satisfy the requirement of unity of use of all of the 
parcels as one unit. Parcel 7 was separated from the 
other two parcels and was lying idle at the time of the 
taking, and there is a lack of testimony that the taking 
of the land from Parcel 5 and 6 adversely affected ! 
the value of Parcel 7. The testimony at the compen· 1 
sation phase of the trial fails to establish the unity 
requirement of use of this property as part of an eco· 
nomic unit and as a part of the commercial establish· 
ment. (TR 383, 384, 502, 503, 575, 576, 631). 
The defendants, Davies and LeSourd, failed to 
establish ownership to the balance of the land included 
in the 6.27 acre unit, upon which testimony was ad-
mitted at the compensation trial. The allowance of 
severage damages is to compensate for the decrease 
in the fair market value that the remaining land could 1 
be sold for on the open market. If a claimant does not 
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own a part of the land in the unit, then he has nothing 
which can be sold on the open market, and hence cannot 
sustain any damages to something he does not own. 
The defendants, Davies and LeSourd, have failed to 
establish ownership of the land in the 6.27 acre unit, 
except Parcel 5, 6 and 7, Exhibit P-4, and have failed 
to meet the required burden of proof they are en-
titled to severance damages to the land not owned and 
are thus not entitled to offer evidence of severance 
damages except as to parcels 5 and 6, Exhibit P-4. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the following facts may be con-
ceded: 
I. Defendants were, on the date of taking, the 
owners of l.33 acres of land, being Parcels 5 and 6, 
Exhibit P-4. 
2 .. 37 acre of said Parcels 5 and 6 were taken in 
fee for highway purposes (Parcels 28 and 28 :H). 
3. The improvements were constructed upon said 
Parcels 5 and 6, Exhibit P-5, P-4. 
4. Defendants were the owners of Parcel 7 as 
shown upon Exhibit P-4. 
To conclude that the defendants were the owners 
of 6.27 acres effected and involved in the take, as the 
Trial Court did, it was necessary to find that old U.S. 
27 
Highway 30-40, which separated Parcels 5 and 6 from 
Parcel 7, Exhibit P-4, no longer in the Grantee, 
Summit County; further, that the record owners of 
the remaining parcels in dispute were likewise divested 
of ownership in said tracts of land notwithstanding 
the evidence and testimony presented of their record , 
ownership in fee simple, and that the defendants were ' 
the "owners of said properties" within the meaning! 
of that term as applied to eminent domain actions. I 
The evidence and testimony by the de-1, 
fendants was void of any substantive or probative proof r 
of such ownership. 1 
Counsel for defendants has argued that defendants 
are entitled to compensation for consequential damage 
because plaintiff did not produce claimants who would 
assert title to the disputed lands, and further that hav- ( 
ing named the defendants as owners of the land in 
the Complaints, the plaintiff is estopped to raise an 
issue of title or challenge the validity of defendants' 
asserted title. 'Vith these contentions we disagree and , 
do not believe the same to be supported by the law or I 
the evidence. To entitle defendants to consequential 
damages to the remaining 5.85 acres, as determined 
by the Trial Court, we believe that it was necessary 
for them to first show : 
1. Unity of title. 
2. Unity of use. 
Furthermore, as this Court has heretofore an· I 
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nounced, the quantum of proof establish a claim of 
ownership must be by clear and convincing evidence, 
and in this regard we believe that the defendants have 
totally failed with respect to the disputed ownership. 
If defendants' title or claim of ownership is to be 
sustained, it must rest upon title by adverse possession 
with respect to the properties held in individual owner-
ship and upon vacation and/ or abandonment with re-
spect to the old U.S. Highway 30-40. Nowhere in the 
record of the proceedings do we find the evidence or 
testimony sufficient to meet the requirement of the 
applicable law favorable to the defendants. 
In view of the foregoing, it is our position and 
contention that the Trial Court committed error and 
that this Honorable Court should reverse the Judgment 
and Decision of the Lower Court and order a new trial 
of the issues involved in this matter. 
Respectively submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney (;.eneral 
State of Utah 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant 
By: Brant H. Wall 
Special Assistant Attorney (;.eneral 
State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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